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Abstract  
This paper examines the regulatory role of the IMF on government spending through political fiscal 
cycles. According to theoretical views, the fiscal policy in the pre-election period reflects an increase in 
government spending or budget expenditures; in postelection period, it takes a restrictive course by 
reducing spending. In the presence of a contractual agreement with the IMF, the theory points to 
limiting and reducing the magnitude of government spending in the pre-election period. According to 
the research results in Croatia, there is an increase in government spending in the election quarter, and 
its decrease in the quarter after the election. On the other hand, the contractual arrangements with the 
IMF show significant reductions in government spending. When a country is under a contractual 
obligation with the IMF, it reduced the government spending in the pre-election period in relation to the 
period when it is not under a contractual obligation. 
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1. Introduction 
Fiscal consolidation has become a matter of fist order after the global world crisis in most sovereign 
and democratic states. Restraining the high levels of deficit and public debt, which inevitably affects 
the destabilization on the economy is also a question of political competence. Apart from general 
economic goals (redistribution of income, economic stabilization, and allocation of public goods), the 
political body is planning its mandate and achieving its own goals, which is realizing the re-election. 
Maintaining political choices through creation of high public spending results in a deficit, increase of 
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public debt and inflationary pressures. In the pre-election period, the fiscal policy is expansive; while in 
postelection period it should be restrictive. However, the restriction of fiscal policy does not necessarily 
mean that it neutralizes the fiscal expansion of the pre-election period, but rather that it is geared 
towards restoring government spending to a normal level. Without external and internal pressures, the 
political body can easily fall into a deficit spiral, particularly if there is an incompetent political body in 
power that has also achieved a re-election. The internal pressures are mostly reflected in established 
fiscal rules, such as fiscal rule that legally limits the increase in public consumption; fiscal rule of 
public debt that limits the increase of public debt above a certain level; or, for example, a fiscal revenue 
rule. The external fiscal constraints arise from internationally defined contracts that serve, among other 
things, for the stabilization and consolidation purpose of public finances. Such limitation also includes 
a contractual obligation with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Through the financial 
arrangements with the IMF, and the IMF conditionality system, the recipient of a financial loan is 
subject to internationally defined public finance balancing regimes so that it can ultimately access the 
entire amount of the loan. 
This paper discusses the role that the IMF in reducing the government spending through the election 
period, when it is, according to theoretical perspectives, expansive. Croatia was taken as an example, 
which had four contractual obligations with the IMF in the period from 1994 through 2006. The 
following discussion provides a theoretical framework of political fiscal cycles and considers the 
theoretical role of the IMF in the reduction of government spending and reduction of the cycle 
magnitude. Furthermore, the empirical analysis verifies the thesis that a country that has a contractual 
obligation with the IMF has less exposure in the pre-election expansion. The last part represents the 
concluding considerations. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Theory of Political Fiscal Cycles 
Theoretical considerations agree in the fact that political fiscal cycles are characterized by expansive 
pre-election public consumption and deficit creation (Efthyvoulou, 2010; Gregor, 2015; Alesina et al., 
1992). The reason for this is the political stimulation of the economy necessary in order to achieve 
political re-election (Heckelman & Whaples, 1996). The historical development of the political fiscal 
cycles theory stems from the limitations of model and empirical settings of political-business cycles 
developed by Nordhaus (1974) and Hibbs (1977), more precisely for the purpose of granting 
independence to central banks. The first models of political-business cycles used the monetary policy 
as the main driving force, which influenced the pre-election decline in the unemployment rate. By 
developing the theory of rational expectations, and by regulating central bank independence by leaving 
only fiscal policy as a means of influencing the electorate, the fiscal policy takes over the main driving 
force of signaling the political competence of the electorate.  
The disadvantages of implementing such a method of fiscal policy management bring inflationary 
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expectations, create budget deficits and increase in public debt. As political elections are held every 
four or five years, and the pre-election stimulation of the economy begins to develop up to a year 
before the election, while the cycle reaches its peak just before the election, results in the short-term 
use of the budget with the long-term consequences. In other words, fiscal consolidation measures are 
needed. 
Fiscal restriction as a safeguard mechanism from the negative consequences of pre-election fiscal 
expansion appears in the form of fiscal rules that limit the implementation of politically motivated 
fiscal policy (Rose, 2006); fiscal transparency that influences the information of the electorate by its 
involvement in the process of budgeting and budget spending, with the reduction of pre-election 
government spending as the result (Alt & Lassen, 2006); also, the fiscal consolidation is linked to the 
degree of development of the country and democracy, so new democracies have recorded higher use of 
spending in the pre-election period (Brender & Drazen, 2005); with a lower information asymmetry 
between the political and the electoral body, the political fiscal cycles are considerably reduced, which 
is a result of increased availability of information and the development of information literacy of the 
electorate (Shi & Svensson, 2006). 
2.2 Empirical Works of Interaction IMF and Political Fiscal Cycles 
One of the determinants of the fiscal policy cycles are the international contract. As such, they 
represent a financial arrangement with the IMF. Fiscal discipline and the conduct of stabilizing fiscal 
policies are contained in many IMF assistance programs. The role of the IMF can be viewed as an 
external pressure to balance the budget (Lassen, 2010). However, a somewhat different view suggests 
that the approval of IMF loans indirectly encourages a country to conduct fiscal expansion by awarding 
financial lending before the election process (Bastoni, 2006). An implicit item that limits pre-election 
fiscal expansion lies in the conditionality program contained in the IMF financial agreements. 
The condition-based system regulates the financial environment that a country needs to ensure in order 
to access the entire amount of the approved loan. A condition-based policy seeks to secure a sustainable 
macroeconomic policy that, along with fiscal policy constraints, also contains constraints for political 
representatives when it comes to using fiscal policy for pre-election purposes (Ebeke & Ölcer, 2013). 
However, although the IMF pays the entire amount of the loan after all agreed conditions have been 
fulfilled, the exceptions are noted when the total amount is withdrawn in a case of economic progress 
and/or for political reasons (Dreher, 2005). 
The empirical research conducted by Dreher i Vaubel (2004) Generalized Least Squares methodology 
confirms a higher budget deficit when the higher amount is borrowed from the Fund, also, that the 
amount borrowed increases in the electoral period, which encourages the creation of a political fiscal 
cycle. In addition, the IMF reduces lending if the deficit of the current year is higher than the deficit of 
the previous year. The research concludes that the conditionality system did not stop the pre-election 
increase in borrowing. Ex-ante conditionality may partially prevent a country from entering into a 
credit engagement with the IMF if the pre-election fiscal expansion is high, while the Ex-post 
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conditionality does not prevent a country from using the loan to finance pre-election expansion. The 
conditionality is largely related to the future mode of action. 
Bastoni (2006) in its research shows that the access to the IMF loans leads to a stronger political 
motivation for creating pre-election fiscal expansion. It also states that the Fund has an incentive to 
increase the amount of credit linked to the prestige, which results from the ability to make important 
business deals. The research examines the impact of the IMF’s credit on the increasing re-election 
probability by increased lending in the pre-election period. The findings confirm the increased lending 
in the mandate of right-wing political parties, and the fact that the increased lending exposure directly 
leads to a greater deficit in the election year, i.e., lending results in creating political fiscal cycles. 
Hyde, O’Mahony (2010) shows the impact of the international scrutiny on pre-election fiscal stimulus 
and proves that it is less likely to be grounded under the IMF arrangement. In addition, the most 
important item that is highlighted is the conditionality system that monitors whether a country fulfills 
the program’s commitments (a sustainable macroeconomic policy associated with fiscal consolidation). 
A country that is under a contractual obligation with the IMF is under greater control when it increases 
the expenditure side of the budget, thus limiting the pre-election period in signaling its competence. 
Also, the argument that supports this fiscal restraint lies in the informative power of the IMF’s reports 
that help creditors with risk mitigation. 
The research conducted by the Ebeke i Ölcer (2013) dynamic panel model confirms the political fiscal 
cycles by increasing government spending and creating a deficit; two years after the elections, 
highlighting the features of fiscal consolidation by reducing the investment spending and increasing 
budget revenues; but the undertaken fiscal consolidation is not strong enough to neutralize the 
pre-election expansion. The specificity of their research has been demonstrated by a lower pre-election 
fiscal expansion if a country is under a contractual obligation with the IMF. Funding through the 
conditionality system encourages the country to adopt a sustainable macroeconomic policy; 
conditionality constrains public finances, leading to a reduction in the use of fiscal policy for election 
purposes. 
As it is clear from the analysis, there is no single consensus on the influence of the IMF on the political 
fiscal cycle, it is justified to notice the position of Vaubel (1991) who statement “IMF lending 
facilitates the expansion. IMF conditionality facilitates the contraction. In this way, the IMF tends to 
contribute to the generation of political fiscal cycles” (according to Dreher & Vaubel, 2004). 
 
3. Election Policy and IMF Arrangement in the Republic of Croatia 
The election processes in Croatia are characterized by changes in power of the two largest parties, the 
Croatian Democratic Union and the Social Democratic Party of Croatia. From the period of the first 
parliamentary political elections that took place in 1992, the two parties have been alternating in 
mandates that lasted for four years. So far, there have been seven regular and one early elections that 
took place in 2016. The parliamentary elections that took place since 1995 are taken into account 
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during the testing. 
 
Table 1. Parliamentary Elections in Croatia 
Date of election  Results 
August 2,1992 Victory of Croatian Democratic Union (CDU) 
October 29, 1995 Victory of (CDU) 
January 3, 2000 Victory of Social Democratic Party of Croatia (SDP) with his coalition partners 
November 23, 2003 Victory of CDU with his coalition partners 
November 25, 2007 Victory of CDU 
December 4, 2011 Victory of SDP with his coalition partners 
November 8, 2015 Victory of CDU with his coalition partners 
October 11, 2016 Victory of CDU 
Source: State Electoral Commission of the Republic of Croatia, http://www.izbori.hr/ws/index.html 
 
The IMF’s presence in Croatia can be traced through several used financial arrangements, i.e., the 
Stand-by arrangement in 1994 that was paid off in 1999; Systematic Transformation Facility, which 
was approved in 1994 and completed in 2002; Extended Fund Facility from 1997 that was completed in 
2000; and three Stand by arrangements that were approved as a precautionary measure from 2001, 
2002 and 2003. These arrangements are linked to the transition period through which Croatia passed in 
the 1990’s. 
 
Table 2. IMF Arrangement with Croatia 
Type of arrangement Date of beginning Date of ending 
Stand-by arrangement 14.10. 1994. 13.4.1996. 
Systemic Transformation Facility 14.10.1994. 27.12.2002. 
Extended Fund Facility 12.3.1997. 11.3.2000. 
Stand-by arrangement 19.3.2001. 18.5.2002. 
Stand-by arrangement 3.2.2003. 2.4.2004. 
Stand-by arrangement 4.8.2004. 15.11.2006. 
Source: International Monetary Fund, 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/exfin2.aspx?memberkey1=227&date1Key=1996-05-31, 
complemented with Ministry of Finance Republic of Croatia, http://www.mfin.hr/hr/mmf  
 
For the analysis in the following chapter, it is important to note that the first three financial 
arrangements were used exclusively, while the last three Stand-by arrangements were approved, but the 
funds were not withdrawn. However, from the previous analysis, it is clear that by entering into a 
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contractual obligation with the IMF, the country is obliged to adopt a sustainable stabilization policy. 
Croatia as a transitional country used the IMF’s financial loans for an easier transition to a 
market-oriented economy so it should be kept in mind that Croatia’s deficit is partly justified. The next 
chapter will define a variable that identifies IMF in the model. 
 
4. Empirical Model and Results 
4.1 Method and Data  
This section provides an overview of the methodological framework and defines the variables used. It 
investigates whether the IMF loans affect the lower budget spending in the pre-election period. The 
research in Croatia was conducted by Vučković (2010) which proves the existence of the political fiscal 
cycles in budget spending. Following this research, this paper will try to find out whether the average 
spending is lower in the electoral period when the country is under a contractual obligation with the 
IMF.  
A regression model was developed for the purpose of empirical proofing, which is based on least 
square method. The same methodology can be found when testing the influence of the political cycles 
on fiscal (and/or monetary) variables when their impact in a particular country is tested (Ryou, 2014; 
Vučković, 2010; Van Dalen & Swank, 1996; Magloire; 1997). The basic equation from which it comes 
is stated as follows: 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
5
𝑖=1 ∗ 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑡 + 𝛾 ∗ 𝐸𝑌(𝑛) + 𝛿 ∗ 𝐼𝑀𝐹 + 𝜑 ∗ 𝐸𝑌(𝑛) ∗ 𝐼𝑀𝐹 + 𝜀𝑡     (1) 
Where the symbol:  
𝑌 represents the dependent variable, i.e., the government spending (EX) 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿 represents the control variables in the model (dependent variable with a lag, GDP growth, 
unemployment rate, GDP pc, crisis) 
𝐸𝑌(𝑛) dummy identifies the election periods  
𝐼𝑀𝐹 dummy identifies the presence of a contractual obligation with the IMF 
𝜀𝑡 represents a standard error 
According to the similar researches of political fiscal cycles, the basic control variables in the model 
are the dependent variable with the time lag (EX_L), GDP growth (EG); unemployment rate (UN); 
GDP per capita (PC). 
The introduction of a dependent variable with a time lag results in the dynamics of government 
spending. Since it can be expected that the future level of spending will inherit the previous level of 
spending, the model introduces a dependent variable with a time lag. The data for this variable are 
taken from the Croatian National Bank database. 
The GDP growth (EG) variable is included in the model as the revenue control effect. For example, 
when an economic growth is registered according to the theoretical assumptions, there is connected to 
improve the fiscal position, and the fiscal consolidation as well. In addition, the connection between the 
economic growth and the fiscal deficit (and spending) is acting on a standard the voters. For example, 
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if an increased economic growth is recorded, the voters do not perceive the fiscal costs involved. In any 
case, the decline in the GDP is causing increased government investment and/or guarantees that may 
cause fiscal social restraint. The data for this variable are taken from the Croatian Bureau of Statistic 
database and from Mikulić and Lovrinčević (2000).  
The unemployment rate (UN) variable is included in the model for its influence on the dependent 
variable. As spending, and hence the deficit are influenced by certain costs arising from the 
unemployment, such as increasing current expenditures, social transfers, employment subsidies, but 
also in the pre-election period by financial stimulation of unemployment voters, this variable in the 
model represents a control variable that wants to isolate the bias of the obtained research results. The 
data for this variable is downloaded from the Eurostat database. 
GDP per capita (PC) variable expresses the standard of the voters and serves as an approximate of 
economic development. 
The variables crisis identifies the global economic crisis that started in 2009, and is included in the 
model as a control variable for its impact on the public finance system. The variable is written as 
follows: 
𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 = {
1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 2009: 𝑄1 − 2012: 𝑄4
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠
} 
The political dummy EY(n) variable identifies the election periods. This variable tests the political 
fiscal cycles in Croatia. The cycles are tested in the pre-election, electoral and postelection quarter. It is 
written in the following form: 
𝐸𝑌(𝑛) = {
1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑒 − 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛; 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛; 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠
} 
{𝑛 = −1; 0; 1} 
The variable indicating the presence of a financial arrangement is marked as a dummy variable and 
estimates the impact of the IMF on government spending. Table 2 shows the start and end times of a 
contractual obligation with the IMF, and the specified IMF variable will contain 1 throughout the 
agreed repayment term of the assumed commitment. The reason for this is that the contractual 
obligation of the country is faced with the implementation of sustainable macroeconomic stabilization, 
which presupposes the neutralization of pre-election government spending or its lower magnitude, 
which has no such influence on the deviation of government spending. It is written in the following 
form: 
𝐼𝑀𝐹 = {
1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑀𝐹 𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠
} 
Interaction variable 𝐸𝑌(𝑛) ∗ 𝐼𝑀𝐹  tests the set theory of the Fund’s impact on the reduction of 
pre-election spending. The influence of the Fund focuses on the testing of electoral fiscal effects only 
when the contractual obligation is present. 
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4.2 Empirical Results 
Econometric analysis begins with Unseasoning of all variables; conducting an unit root test for 
Stationarity variables; Heteroskedasticity; existence of second-order residual auto-correlation; and with 
checkup of normality of distribution. 
Unseasoning was performed by TRAMO/SEATS method; Stationary testing was performed by the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test; Heteroskedasticity with the White test; second-order residual 
autocorrelation with the Breusch Godfrey LM test; while the normality of the distribution was 
confirmed with the Jarque-Bera test. Results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test and Jarque-Bera test 
are provided in the appendings at the end of the paper. Results of the Breusch-Godfrey LM test and 
White test are in Table 3. The results of the initially estimated model confirm the existence of the 
second-order residual autocorrelation, therefore, the Newey-West correction was used for the correction 
of errors, after which the robust error estimates were obtained. The following regression equation is 
estimated after the performed tests: 
∆𝑙𝑛 𝐸𝑋 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1∆𝑙𝑛 𝐸𝑋_𝐿 + 𝛽2∆ ln 𝐸𝐺 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛 𝑈𝑁 + 𝛽4∆𝑙𝑛 𝑃𝐶 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 + 𝛾1𝐸𝑌(𝑛) +
𝛿1𝐼𝑀𝐹 + 𝜑1𝐸𝑌(𝑛) ∗ 𝐼𝑀𝐹 + 𝜀𝑡                     (2) 
The research is conducted over a period from 1995:Q1 to 2015:Q4. The results of the econometric 
research that are shown in Table 3 point to a conclusion that IMF has a limiting role in raising spending 
in the pre-election period. 
 
Table 3. Results of Testing 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
∆ 𝒍𝒏 𝑳_𝑬𝑿 -0,39 
(,06)*** 
-0,37 
(,06)*** 
-0,37 
(,04)*** 
∆ 𝒍𝒏 𝑬𝑮 0,20 
(,81) 
0,20 
(,84) 
0,21 
(,74) 
∆ 𝒍𝒏 𝑷𝑪 -0,74 
(,83) 
-0,66 
(,84) 
-0,40 
(,76) 
 𝒍𝒏 𝑼𝑵 -0,04 
(,01)*** 
-0,05 
(,01)*** 
-0,06 
(,01)*** 
𝑪𝑹𝑰𝑺𝑰𝑺 -0,03 
(,01)*** 
-0,03 
(0,01)** 
-0,04 
(,01)*** 
𝑬𝒀(−𝟏) 0,01 
(,01) 
  
𝑬𝒀(𝟎)  0,02 
(,01)* 
 
𝑬𝒀(𝟏)   -0,06 
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(,02)*** 
𝑰𝑴𝑭 0,01 
(,01) 
0,02 
(,01) 
0,01 
(,01) 
𝑬𝒀(𝒏) ∗ 𝑰𝑴𝑭 0,07 
(,05) 
-0,06 
(,03)** 
0,05 
(,04) 
𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒔 0,15 
(,04)*** 
0,15 
(,05)*** 
0,19 
(,04)*** 
𝐑𝟐  0,28 0,25 0,26 
DW 2,34 2,35 2,36 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test (p value) 0,002 0,005 0,002 
White test (p value) 0,83 0,62 0,36 
Number of observation 82 82 82 
Note. *** p<0,01; ** p<0,05; * p<0,1; in parentheses are robust standard errors (Newey-West method); 
all variable are in logarithmic form; all calculations are made with the help of EViews 7 software. 
Source: Author. 
 
The results of the Model 1, which estimates the changes in government spending in pre-election quarter, 
suggest that there are no significant changes in the quarter and the deviation of government spending. 
Model 2 is used to estimate the changes in government spending in the election quarter. Namely, this 
quarter saw an increase in government spending, the EY(0) coefficient is significant and positive, and 
points to increased public allocations in the election quarter, confirming theoretical views. But when 
the coefficient obtained with the interaction variable that tests changes in the election quarter is 
observed, when the contractual obligation with the IMF is also present, the coefficient is negative and 
significant. The obtained results point to the fact that the government spending in the electoral period 
decreases when the IMF is present, which is also in line with the theoretical representation. 
The results of the postelection quarter tests, the Model 3, also confirm the theoretical views on the 
restrictive postelection fiscal policy. In the quarter after the election, the coefficient with the observed 
variable is negative and significant and indicates a decrease in government spending after the political 
elections. 
Several conclusions can be drawn in line with the results of the testing: 
(i) Pre-election period is characterized by an expansive fiscal policy which, according to theoretical 
considerations, influences the signaling of political competence; helps achieving re-election; indirectly 
influences increase of voter’s standard on the short-term basis; 
(ii) Postelection period is marked by restrictive fiscal policy or reduction of government spending 
that is necessary as the fiscal expansion is triggered for purely political opportunities; for balancing of 
the budget; reduction of inflationary pressures; 
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(iii) When a contractual arrangement with the IMF is present, the election period is characterized by a 
fiscal contraction of government spending, thus not detecting political fiscal cycles. Similar findings 
can be found in Hyde, O’Mahony (2010) and Ebeke and Ölcer (2013). 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper is primarily focused on testing one of the determinants of reducing government spending in 
the pre-election period. Due to external pressures to improve the system of public finances and 
macroeconomic stability under the contractual obligation with the IMF, the countries receiving 
financial loans adopt a conditionality system that strives for fiscal consolidation. The condition-based 
system is governed by the financial environment that the country needs to provide in order to access the 
entire amount of the approved loan. The condition policy seeks to secure a sustainable macroeconomic 
policy that, along with fiscal policy constraints, also contains constraints for political representatives to 
use fiscal policy for pre-election purposes. However, a somewhat different view suggests that the 
approval of IMF loans directly encourages the country to fiscal expansion by allocating financial 
lending before the election. 
There are numerous examples of countries that are pursuing policy goals by adopting expansive fiscal 
policy while after the end date of political elections they adopt a more restrictive fiscal policy. There 
are also examples of testing various determinants of political fiscal cycles, such as fiscal rules, fiscal 
transparency, new democracy effect, informing voters or the influence of the IMF program. 
The results of the previous research regarding the connection of the IMF programs with the political 
fiscal cycles do not provide an unambiguous answer. According to one, in the pre-election period, the 
IMF credit increases, encouraging pre-election expansion, according to others, the pre-election fiscal 
restriction stem from the conditionality system. According to the above contradictory standpoints, 
Vaubel’s statement (1991) “IMF lending facilitates the expansion. IMF conditionality facilitates the 
contraction. In this way, the IMF tends to contribute to the generation of political fiscal cycles”. 
According to the results of this research, Croatia shows a pre-election increase in government spending 
and postelection reduction of spending. However, when a contractual arrangement with the IMF is 
present, pre-election time marks a decline in government spending. In accordance with the theoretical 
views, this example shows a positive influence on government spending and a balance of public 
finances in pre-election time. In this case, the IMF programs limit the emergence of political fiscal 
cycles. 
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Appendix 
Results of ADF test for time series 
Variable Constant Trend and constant No trend and constant 
EX -1,33 -1,81 3,25 
∆ EX -11,91*** -11,96 -2,99*** 
EG -1,98 -0,18 1,82 
∆ EG -6,38*** -6,81*** -3,42*** 
UN -3,30** -3,36* -0,31 
PC -1,92 0,07 1,97 
∆ PC -4,55*** -7,53*** -1,18 
Note. It is used Akaike info criterion; in table are value of t statistics; assumption of nonstationarity can 
be rejected with significant of *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
Source: Author. 
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Results of Jarque-Bera test 
 
 
Source: Author. 
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Series: Residuals
Sample 1995Q3 2015Q4
Observations 82
Mean      -1.58e-17
Median  -0.001627
Maximum  0.154878
Minimum -0.164655
Std. Dev.   0.059408
Skewness   0.089697
Kurtosis   3.375653
Jarque-Bera  0.592099
Probability  0.743751
